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Hazardous Materials Tags > Tag based links for Accident

The following links have been tagged accident by users just like you, because these resources are off-site we cannot guarantee the accuracy or quality of any third-party information.

  1. Methods to reduce traffic crashes involving deer: what works and what does not.: Traffic Inj Prev, Vol. 5, No. 2. (June 2004), pp. 122-131.More than 1.5 million traffic crashes involving deer, producing at least $1.1 billion in vehicle damage and about 150 fatalities, are estimated to occur annually in the United States. Deer-related crashes are increasing as both deer populations and vehicular travel increase. Many methods have been used in attempts to reduce deer crashes, often with little scientific foundation and limited evaluation. This article summarizes the methods and reviews the evidence of their effectiveness and the situations in which each may be useful. The only widely accepted method with solid evidence of effectiveness is well-designed and maintained fencing, combined with underpasses or overpasses as appropriate. Herd reduction is controversial but can be effective. Deer whistles appear useless. Roadside reflectors appear to have little long-term effect, although additional well-designed evaluations are needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. Both temporary passive signs and active signs appear promising in specific situations, but considerable research is required to evaluate long-term driver response and to improve and test deer detection technology for active signs. Other methods using advanced technology require substantial additional research and evaluation.JH Hedlund, PD Curtis, G Curtis, AF Williams

    Source: Traffic Inj Prev, Vol. 5, No. 2. (June 2004), pp. 122-131.

  2. Public Response to the Tokai Nuclear Accident: Risk Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 6. (2001), pp. 1039-1046.This article discusses the influence of the September 30, 1999 nuclear accident in Tokai village (Japan) on the public's attitudes toward nuclear power in Japan. The data used in this report were taken from the results of two surveys conducted mainly to measure the attitudes of the Japanese public with regard to the use of nuclear power in Japan. The first survey was done before the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and also in Osaka and Nagoya. The second survey, which took place after the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and in Osaka and Nagoya, also included residents in a number of other cities of various sizes throughout Japan. The results of the two surveys showed that (1) acceptability of and trust in nuclear power operation had decreased, (2) perceived accident likelihood and public interest had significantly increased, and (3) there had been neither significant nor even a small change in the public's self-rated knowledge about nuclear power or their distrust of the government. The results also showed that the ratio of nuclear power generation opponents to total respondents had considerably increased (7% to 23%) whereas nuclear power generation supporters had moderately decreased (1% to 12%).Tsunoda Katsuya

    Source: Risk Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 6. (2001), pp. 1039-1046.

  3. Can injury prevention efforts go too far?: Reflections on some possible implications of Vision Zero for road accident fatalities: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 31, No. 3. (May 1999), pp. 265-286.The Swedish National Road Administration has launched a long term vision of a road transport system in which nobody is killed or sustains an injury resulting in permanent impairment (Vision Zero). This paper examines some possible implications of Vision Zero for traffic fatalities. The main points of the paper can be summarised as follows: An objective of eliminating traffic deaths can be interpreted as an application of a general principle of minimising mortality. Minimising overall mortality implies that a survival lottery must be introduced, at any rate as long as there is a shortage of organs for transplants. A survival lottery is a scheme in which people are drawn at random to sacrifice their life for the benefit of others. An objective of eliminating a certain cause of death, like traffic accidents, may be so expensive to realise that there is so much less resources available to control other causes of death that general mortality increases. Several analyses of the relationship between income per capita and general mortality based on Norwegian data document a negative relationship between income and mortality. The loss of income that induces an additional statistical death, due to economic inefficiency, is estimated to between 25 and 317 million NOK (3.8-47.5 million US dollars). These estimates are in line with those of most previous studies. No study of the relationship between income and mortality fully satisfies commonly used criteria of causality. However, the balance of evidence suggests that the relationship between income and mortality is a causal one. A hypothetical programme designed to implement Vision Zero for traffic fatalities was developed and its effects on the number of fatalities estimated. Implementing the whole programme could reduce the number of traffic deaths in Norway from about 300 per year to about 90 per year. Applying the lowest estimate of the income loss that induces an additional death (25 million NOK), it was estimated that implementing the entire hypothetical Vision Zero programme would increase general mortality by about 1355. This would lead to a net increase of about 1145 deaths per year (1355 minus 210 prevented traffic deaths). The analyses presented in this paper show that the possibility cannot be ruled out that a massive effort to eliminate traffic deaths would be counterproduct ive in terms of overall mortality. This possibility must be regarded as a moral dilemma by advocates of Vision Zero, who have invoked the ethical principle that `one must always do everything in one's power to prevent death or serious injury' to justify the vision.Rune Elvik

    Source: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 31, No. 3. (May 1999), pp. 265-286.

  4. Bicycle safety behavior in Paris and Boston: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 30, No. 5. (September 1998), pp. 679-687.Concer ns about bicycle-relate d deaths and injuries have led to extensive injury prevention efforts in the United States, yet these concerns are not universal. For instance, in France attitudes toward bicycle safety are quite different. To understand more about variation in urban bicycle safety behavior, we observed passing bicyclists in Paris and Boston. In addition to helmet use, we looked at use of lights at night. Among 5 808 passing bicyclists, there were large differences in helmet and light use: only 2.2% of Paris bicyclists wore helmets compared to 31.5% in Boston. In contrast, 46.8% of nighttime Paris bicyclists had working head or tail lights compared to only 14.8% in Boston. These large and seemingly contradictory percentages are the result of different laws and public health priorities, types of bicycle riding, and perceived risks. Suggestions for further research and practical ways to improve U.S. bicycle safety behavior are discussed.J Osberg

    Source: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 30, No. 5. (September 1998), pp. 679-687.

  5. Tyre tread marks on the body without internal injuries: International Journal of Legal Medicine, Vol. 104, No. 6. (1 November 1992), pp. 355-356.Summar y Two cases are presented involving a 5-year-old boy with tyre tread impressions on the back and right arm and a 4-year-old girl with tread marks on the head but both had no internal injuries. These cases suggest that injuries to internal organs do not always occur when the trunk or head is run over by the wheels of a vehicle.Tsuneo Suzuki, Ryuetsu Sato

    Source: International Journal of Legal Medicine, Vol. 104, No. 6. (1 November 1992), pp. 355-356.

  6. A framework for the evidence base to support Health Impact Assessment.: J Epidemiol Community Health, Vol. 56, No. 2. (February 2002), pp. 132-138.OBJECT IVE: To introduce a conceptual structure that can be used to organise the evidence base for Health Impact Assessment (HIA). BACKGROUND: HIA can be used to judge the potential health effects of a policy, programme or project on a population, and the distribution of those effects. Progress has been made in incorporating HIA into routine practice, especially (in the UK) at local level. However, these advances have mainly been restricted to process issues, including policy engagement and community involvement, while the evidence base has been relatively neglected. RELATING POLICIES TO THEIR IMPACT ON HEALTH: The key distinctive feature of HIA is that determinants of health are not taken as given, but rather as factors that themselves have determinants. Nine ways are distinguished in which evidence on health and its determinants can be related to policy, and examples are given from the literature. The most complete of these is an analysis of health effects in the context of a comparison of options. A simple model, the policy/risk assessment model (PRAM), is introduced as a framework that relates changes in levels of exposures or other risk factors to changes in health status. This approach allows a distinction to be made between the technical process of HIA and the political process of decision making, which involves lines of accountability . Extension of the PRAM model to complex policy areas and its adaptation to non-quantitati ve examples are discussed. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE: A sound evidence base is essential to the long term reputation of HIA. Research gaps are discussed, especially the need for evidence connecting policy options with changes in determinants of health. It is proposed that policy options could be considered as "exposure" variables in research. The methodology needs to be developed in the course of work on specific issues, concentrated in policy areas that are relatively tractable. CONCLUSIONS: A system of coordination needs to be established, at national or supranational level, building on existing initiatives. The framework suggested in this paper can be used to collate and evaluate what is already known, both to identify gaps where research is required and to enable an informed judgement to be made about the potential health impacts of policy options. These judgements should be made widely available for policy makers and for those undertaking health impact assessment.M Joffe, J Mindell

    Source: J Epidemiol Community Health, Vol. 56, No. 2. (February 2002), pp. 132-138.

  7. Getting off your bike: cycling accidents in Great Britain in 1990-1999: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 35, No. 4. (July 2003), pp. 549-556.The paper extracts and tabulates selected incidence and fatality rates of cycling accidents recorded by the police in Great Britain during 1990-1999, in a database of over 30,000 standardised reports of fatal or serious injury accidents. Since usable estimates of exposure to risk in cycling are not available, the concept of exposure invariance is developed to estimate the relative risk of different sorts of bicycle/vehicl e encounter. Any bias from under-reportin g of serious injury accidents is shown to be boundable if the probability of under-reportin g is constant.Mervy n Stone, Jeremy Broughton

    Source: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 35, No. 4. (July 2003), pp. 549-556.

  8. No clear evidence from countries that have enforced the wearing of helmets: BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.), Vol. 332, No. 7543. (25 March 2006), pp. 722-725.[Journ al Article, Review; 20 Refs; In English; England; MEDLINE]DL Robinson

    Source: BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.), Vol. 332, No. 7543. (25 March 2006), pp. 722-725.

  9. Vision Zero - Is it irrational?: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 41, No. 6. (July 2007), pp. 559-567.Vision Zero, the Swedish road safety policy goal, states that in the long run, no person should be killed or seriously injured as a consequence of road traffic. Since its adoption in 1997, the goal has been seriously criticised. In 2007, performance of the first interim target will be evaluated and a new interim target will be set. In this paper, we summarise the experiences from working with the goal and analyse the criticism that has been put forward against it. The most common criticism is that Vision Zero is an irrational goal. In order to evaluate this criticism, we compare Vision Zero with an independently developed list of adequacy criteria for rational goal-setting. We conclude that according to these criteria, Vision Zero is not irrational.Hol ger Rosencrantz, Karin Edvardsson, Sven Hansson

    Source: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 41, No. 6. (July 2007), pp. 559-567.

  10. Death on the Streets: Cars and the Mythology of Road Safety: (28 February 1993)Robert Davis

    Source: (28 February 1993)

If you would like to find additional social bookmark based links on the topic of accident we recommend the Open Tag Directory > Accident. If you would like to find related tags we recommend Tag Patterns > Accident.


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